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Offshore law. 
The tension between the  
universality of human rights 
and the practice of states in the 
management of migration flows
1. IntroductIon*
An article published by the Guardian on August 9, 2016, by the title “A short 
history of  Nauru, Australia’s dumping ground for refugees” opens up the 
“Pandora’s box” connected to the treatment of  refugees wishing to enter 
Australia, shedding lights on the harsh life’s conditions they suffer. Far from 
being an isolated case, this represents a widespread practice. Truly, today 
States are more and more inclined to manage migration flows outside their 
territories creating hotspots where asylum seekers are processed or conclud-
ing agreements to stop the fluxes of  migrants in transit States or, directly, in 
their States of  origin. Such a practice is evidence of  a shift towards an extra-
territorial enforcement of  law.
Clearly, the externalisation of  the management of  migration flows under-
mines the protection of  the rights of  asylum seekers on several grounds. In 
fact, as anticipated above, life’s conditions in these hotspots are below the 
threshold of  human decency as established by international law, and thus 
amount to violations of  human rights. At the same time, the practice con-
sisting in blocking migration fluxes in foreign States might count as – among 
others – a violation of  the principle of  non-refoulement.
At a first glance, this may be surprising as the above-mentioned rights be-
long to a category of  rights considered to be of  a customary nature, therefore 
binding all States of  the international community. This could be even more 
surprising if  compared to the jurisprudence of  international courts – and in 
particular the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) – which is evolv-
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ing towards an extensive approach to the extraterritorial application of  the 
European Convention of  Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention). An 
approach that is likely to influence the interpretation of  other human rights 
treaties, the application of  which is not geographically limited.
It seems that there is a growing tension between the scope of  human 
rights law – that aspires to universality – and the conduct of  States, which 
is based on legal decisions that, by allowing extraterritorial actions, openly 
violate human rights law. Against this background, it seems that the real 
problem is not the scope of  human rights law, but, rather, its enforcement; a 
circumstance granting the States a regime of  impunity. 
This paper argues that more attention should be paid to the enforcement 
of  human rights of  asylum seekers than to their scope. In this regard, I will 
develop the idea that domestic courts’ role should be enhanced. After having 
presented the features of  States’ practice in the field of  the management of  
migration flows, I will demonstrate that human rights law has the potential 
to apply extraterritorially, thus limiting the conduct of  States in respect to 
asylum seekers. I will then present the real problem, which consists in the 
lack of  enforcement mechanisms in international law. In conclusion, I will 
discuss a possible theoretical framework for bolstering the role of  national 
judges in the protection of  asylum seekers’ rights.
2. offshore law
The concept of  law enforcement entails the exercise of  coercive power to 
guarantee public security and to enforce law and order (Melzer 2009) and 
was originally conceived as a prerogative of  sovereignty. Sovereignty, as it is 
known, has always been linked with territory (Crawford 2012) and territory 
has always been regarded as the “point of  departure in settling most ques-
tions that concern international relations”.1
Nowadays practice shows that States exercise their coercive powers out-
side their territories, in particular when they perform law enforcement oper-
ations. There are several evidences of  this practice: the use of  drones, digital 
1 Permanent Court of  Arbitration, Island of  Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States 
of  America), Award of  4 April 1928, in Reports of  International Arbitral Awards, vol. 
XI, p. 838.
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surveillance, extraordinary renditions, anti-piracy operations and so on. The 
management of  migration flows makes no exception.
The above-mentioned activities may appear to imply that a strict link be-
tween law enforcement and its territorial dimension no more exists, or that 
an extraterritorial dimension should be included in the definition of  territory 
(Milano 2013). This is no novelty as Rolando Quadri, in 1968, proposed a 
functional approach to the very notion of  territory (Quadri 1968). Practice is 
now confirming this doctrinal position. Certain authors believe that territory 
is losing importance even in the law of  the state (Forteau 2007).
Such a practice is part of  a broader process that is leading towards the 
detachment of  States’ authority from their territories (Brölmann 2007). This 
process has also been regarded as a process of  de-territorialization of  inter-
national law (Oddenino 2015); States are increasingly perceiving the need 
to protect the interests of  the international community as a whole even in 
relation to conducts occurring beyond their borders.2
The new direction of  States’ practice has many causes. It can be considered 
as a sort of  dark side of  globalization (Megrét 2009) or as a side effect of  an 
“unprecedented degree of  international cooperation” (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Vedsted-Hansen 2017). Attempting to find a unique label, some schol-
ars have regarded this practice as “transnational law enforcement” (Gam-
meltoft-Hansen and Vedsted-Hansen 2017; Gibney 2013). This definition 
seems to quite appropriately describe the features of  States’ action. 
In harsher terms, some of  the activities that States carry out outside their 
borders are described as “legal black holes” (Steyn 2004). The use of  the 
adjective ‘legal’ to describe a ‘black hole’ seems to be paradoxical: Indeed, 
a ‘black hole’ is usually a place that is not governed by law. However, the 
conducts of  States in extraterritorial law enforcement is not outside the law, 
as it finds its basis in national or supranational legal principles, which are the 
result of  a precise political will. 
We can easily say that the conduct of  States is acquiring an extraterritorial 
dimension which can be placed in a legal framework. Such a dimension implies 
an extension of  States’ jurisdiction, defined as “the competence of  a State to 
2 This is stated in the join individual opinion of  judges Higgins, Koojimans and 
Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant Case. See International Court of  Justice, Arrest 
Warrant of  11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of  Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of  14 
February 2002.
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make, apply and enforce rules of  conduct in respect of  persons, property or 
events beyond its territory” (Kamminga 2012). That is the reason why, to de-
scribe this practice, we can borrow a term from a book about contemporary 
trends in global economy - “Offshore world” (Palan 2003) – and decline it for 
our purposes as “offshore law”. In fact, extraterritorial law enforcement activi-
ties of  States find their legal justification in national or supranational laws such 
as European Union laws and United Nations Security Council resolutions that 
explicitly allow them to act outside their territories.
As anticipated, this practice also involves the management of  migration 
flows and, consequently, the approach of  States towards asylum seekers.
In recent years, States have been facing an unprecedented ‘refugee cri-
sis’. The solutions envisaged by many States consist in reducing the number 
of  refugees that reach their borders by intercepting them in the high seas, 
creating extraterritorial hotspots, or concluding agreements with transit or 
countries of  origin. The rationale of  these solutions is quite clear: States are 
unwilling or unable to accept refugees and even the most sophisticated asy-
lum system, such as the European one, is proving to be ineffective (Munari 
2016; Nascimbene 2016). Moreover, this has become an issue to which many 
political parties make recourse to gain electoral consensus, associating the 
‘refugee crisis’ with the terrorist threat. 
I mentioned earlier the special case of  Australia. It is worth recalling it, as 
it appropriately represents the practice of  de-territorializing the management 
of  migration flows. In 2012, Australia and Nauru signed an agreement by 
which the latter agreed to assess people’s claim for international protection 
and to host a facility to detain them, while the former assumed the cost of  
the entire project. Since then, and until 2014, Australia has been moving to 
Nauru all of  its asylum seekers. According to a recent report3 published by 
Amnesty International, more than one thousand individuals are kept in Na-
uru, of  whom more than half   are detained in processing centers. As antici-
pated, detention in Nauru is severe to the point that if  asylum seekers do not 
die because of  the harsh conditions, they frequently commit suicide. Chil-
dren represent the most affected category of  subjects. In its latest report, 
the UN’s Committee on the Rights of  the Child highlighted the “inhuman 
3 Amnesty international, Island of  Despair. Australia’s “Processing” of  Refugees on Nauru, 
2016, available at www.amnesty.org.
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and degrading treatment, including physical, psychological and sexual abuse, 
against asylum seeking and refugee children living in the Regional Processing 
Centres” in Nauru.
The Special Rapporteur of  the United Nations Human Rights Council 
on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
Juan E. Méndez has recently condemned Australia’s indefinite detention of  
asylum seekers in processing centers.
Australia is not isolated: the management of  migration flows is character-
ized by conducts that share the same rationale.
 As to Europe, the operations set up by the European Union agency 
Frontex, which has the mandate to control EU external borders, have been 
raising several concerns. Since the deployment of  the first mission, Hera 
I, Frontex contributed to pushback a high number of  migrants. In a state-
ment celebrating the first five years of  activity, the Agency has highlighted 
how: 
[T]he close proximity of  these joint maritime and airborne patrols to the 
coast of  West Africa was crucial: it meant that the unseaworthy boats used 
by the irregular immigrants could be stopped and turned back to safety be-
fore the dangerous voyage to the Canary Islands could claim even more lives. 
[…] The methodology of  the organised crime people facilitating this flow of  
migrants was adaptable. We knew we faced a real challenge.4
It is clear from this passage that the activity of  Frontex took place outside 
the territorial sea of  the EU member States and in close proximity to the 
coast of  African States and consisted in the ‘rescue’ of  migrants and in their 
‘turning back’ to their countries of  origin. Although this action might reduce 
the number of  people arriving in Europe, it shifts border control activities 
to an area – the high seas or the territorial sea of  third countries –, which we 
may consider extraterritorial by its very nature (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2010).
The involvement of  third countries in migration control is often taking 
the form of  specific agreements between States with the aim of  countering 
irregular migration. Typical examples are the agreement between Italy and 
Libya of  2009 and that signed between the same parties in January 2017. 
4 Frontex, Beyond the Frontiers. Frontex: The First Five Years, Warsaw, 2010, p. 32, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/Beyond_the_Frontiers.pdf
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Even the European Union made use of  this practice. In March 2016, it 
reached an agreement – the legal status of  which is still disputed (Cannizza-
ro 2016) – with Turkey to reduce the number of  refugees approaching and 
entering EU borders (Favilli 2016).
To sum up, these agreements externalise the processing of  asylum seek-
ers, which is delegated to third States as part of  broader deals that are favour-
able to those countries. As a consequence asylum procedures are performed 
in the countries of  origin of  migrants, or in transit countries or in detention 
centres (Noll 2003).
States are progressively delegating their powers to third entities – in-
ternational organizations, third countries or private persons or organiza-
tions – over which they do not exercise a full control.
Although migration control procedures are normally carried out by states 
within their borders, this sort of  activities are now being often conducted 
outside of  state borders, either in the high seas, or in countries where human 
rights are not generally enforced. 
Within this scenario, the rights of  migrants are severely affected. 
Clearly, moving asylum procedures to third countries, whose respect for 
human rights is dubious at the least, may be detrimental to the protection of  
migrants; pushback operations are, instead, a clear violation of  the principle 
of  non-refoulement. Insofar as there is no supranational institution that can is-
sue sanctions and establish that a given recipient state must enforce migrants’ 
right of  asylum, the issue will hardly be solved.
3. Is human rIghts law expandIng Its scope? the role of customary law.
As seen in the previous paragraph, the extraterritorial management of  mi-
gration flows impacts on the protection of  human rights. 
States are trying to move migration control procedures outside their bor-
ders for a specific reason: normally (albeit not always), recipient states are 
rich and respectful of  human rights. Within their borders, they are obliged by 
their own domestic law to fulfil certain standards in the treatment of  individ-
uals, including migrants. If, however, migration controls take place outside 
of  their territory, this obligation no longer holds and, more importantly, they 
cannot be held responsible for any failure to enforce human rights outside 
of  their territorial jurisdiction.
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The effectiveness of  this defense depends largely on the capacity of  hu-
man rights law to expand its scope. If  human rights law were to be enforce-
able extraterritorially, the conduct of  States would have to be subjected to 
the jurisdiction of  national or supranational courts. 
The hypothetical formulation of  the previous sentence is justified by the 
fact that the enforcement of  human rights law depends largely on the iden-
tification of  the source of  law that contains the appropriate human rights 
provisions. 
From the perspective of  the sources of  international law, in particular in-
ternational treaties and customary law, can we really say that human rights are 
universal? In other words, can we say that human rights law is part of  cus-
tomary law and, therefore, binding the international community as a whole?
It is true that States’ actions shall be influenced by all the obligations 
flowing from international law, included those that have acquired a custom-
ary status. As James Eadie put it in his plaidorie in the Al-Skeini case before 
the ECtHR, international law binds States in their extraterritorial action even 
if  treaties are not applicable. In addition to this consideration, it should be 
noted that, in the absence of  a specific applicable treaty, general international 
law – customary international law and general principles – is considered the 
best law available in purely international scenarios such as activities in the 
high seas and involvement of  international organizations (Lubell 2008). In 
fact, the scope of  customary law is universal in nature and its application 
does not depend on the number of  human rights treaties that States have 
ratified. 
Nowadays it is under discussion if  and to what extent the whole set of  
human rights norms is part of  customary law. 
The customary nature of  human rights might be derived from the inclu-
sion of  the protection of  human rights in the wording of  the United Nations 
Charter (Lauterpacht 1950). The protection of  human rights is mentioned in 
Article 1, in which the purposes of  the United Nations are set forth: “The 
purposes of  the United Nations are: […] To achieve international problems 
of  cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian char-
acter and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion”.
This provision should be read along with Article 55 of  the UN Charter: 
“[…] The United Nations shall promote: […] universal respect for, and ob-
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servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion”. The following article calls on UN 
member States to “take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of  the purposes set forth in Article 55”. 
It is uncertain if  Articles 55 and 56 impose an obligation upon States to 
respect human rights. The International Court of  Justice tried to solve this 
doubt in the Opinion on The legal consequences for States of  the continued presence 
of  South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970).5 
The Court, in paragraph 131 of  that opinion, seems to confirm the binding 
nature of  the provision in the UN Charter which impose to States parties a 
duty “to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. 
To establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations 
exclusively based on grounds of  race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which con-
stitute a denial of  fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of  the purposes and 
principles of  the Charter” (emphasis added).
The previous quotation seems to imply the binding nature of  the UN 
Charter provision (Schwelb 1972). Since it has been ratified by the whole in-
ternational community, it can be inferred that the protection of  human rights 
is an obligation that all States are bound to respect.
Such a strong basis was reinforced after the adoption of  the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights. It is true that the UDHR is enclosed in a 
non-binding instrument, i.e. a General Assembly Resolution, however, it is 
nowadays uncontroversial the fact that the Declaration is part of  customary 
international law (Clapham 2006).
Is this enough to establish the customary nature of  human rights? What 
seems to be doubtful is the process that eventually led to the formation of  
general international law in this field (Dimitrijevic 2006). In international 
law, a rule is considered to be customary if  it satisfies two conditions: it 
must be supported by States’ practice (diuturnitas) and such practice must 
be considered by States as a binding rule upon them (opinio juris) (Conforti 
2015). 
5 International Court of  Justice, Legal Consequences for States of  the Continued Presence 
of  South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of  21 June 1971.
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According to some scholars, human rights law is a sort of  special re-
gime in international law that should not be assimilated to other branches 
of  international law. The core of  this position is that human rights law is 
not subjected to the general categories of  international law and deserves 
a special treatment. It follows that the process leading to the formation of  
customary international law in the field of  human rights is different from 
that regarding other branches of  international law (Flauss 1998). In this par-
ticular branch, States’ practices are difficult to establish, as human rights are 
frequently violated, therefore the affirmation of  a consolidated opinio juris 
might be sufficient to assess the existence of  a rule of  general international 
law (Condorelli 2012). 
According to other scholars, customary law is not the most appropriate 
source of  international law for human rights, as an ad hoc category of  general 
international law should be imagined for them (Simma and Alston 1988; 
Henkin 1995-1996) in order to strengthen their universal application.
These positions, albeit based on arguments that are formally different, 
share a common rationale, that seems to be twofold. First, States’ practice in 
the field of  human rights is characterized by frequent violations, therefore it 
is difficult to establish a diuturnitas favorable to their protection. Second, hu-
man rights law does not really regard the relations between States, but, rather, 
the relations between States and individuals. 
As anticipated above, this is not the mainstream position. Rather, it seems 
to be fiercely countered by other scholars, who make recourse to at least two 
arguments. 
First, the idea that human rights law is a ‘special regime’ is disputed. Indeed, 
it regards the relations between States, which only indirectly concern the rights 
of  individuals. the methods of  formation of  the rules are thus the same appli-
cable to any other rule of  international law (Pellet 2000; Wood 2016).
Second, and according to a more formal argument, the content of  human 
rights’ norms is not clear. Being uncertain the source of  international law in 
this field, it is not easy to grasp the content of  the rule (D’Amato 2010). One 
may argue that the content of  customary human rights rules is equivalent to 
that enshrined in human rights treaties and developed through human rights 
courts, but human rights treaties are valid only inter partes and therefore the 
consent of  States should be requested to consider such norms applicable.
The doctrinal debate on the customary nature of  human rights is charac-
terized by a plurality of  views and seems to lead to a dead end. In fact, it can 
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be used both by advocates of  a sort of  universality of  human rights and by 
the States that wish to act legibus soluti, especially in the field of  migration 
control.
The practice of  national and international courts, by contrast, shows that 
customary international law can be used to extend States’ jurisdiction and, 
therefore, to expand the scope of  human rights law.
The Canada Supreme Court explicitly mentioned international human 
rights law in order to grant the protection afforded by the Canadian Charter 
of  Rights and Freedoms to its citizens abroad in the Khadr case. The reference 
to international human rights law could be understood as a reference to those 
human rights’ norms that have acquired a customary status (Keitner 2011). 
Such an approach is not new in Canadian jurisprudence; the Canadian 
Charter was invoked in international contexts in two extradition cases, where 
the fugitive persons feared to be executed in the United States. In the Kindler 
and Burns cases, respectively decided in 1991 and 2001, the Supreme Court 
made reference to the Canadian ‘basic constitutional values’; more in detail, 
in the Burns case, the Supreme Court also referred to the international mor-
atoria of  the death penalty in order to identify Canadian values in interna-
tional law. 
The Canadian cases are examples of  extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, in the sense that a domestic act – the Canadian charter – was considered 
binding, notwithstanding the presumption against extraterritoriality, on the 
basis that the conducts at stake were in violation of  international human 
rights law. Indeed, the Canadian Charter is not meant to be binding outside 
of  Canada, but the Supreme Court decided to overcome this limitation due 
to the specific facts of  the cases which amounted to a violation of  human 
rights on the part of  the plaintiff.
A similar approach inspired a decision of  the Court of  Appeals in The 
Hague in 2011 in the famous Nuhanovic case. The Court was asked to apply 
Dutch law to the Dutch military contingent deployed in Former Yugoslavia 
within the United Nations peacekeeping operation UNPROFOR. Interest-
ingly, the judges identified the applicable norms by reference to the custom-
ary duties of  the Netherlands in the field of  human rights. This conclusion 
is of  paramount importance because the Court assessed that some human 
rights norms – in that case the right to life – were of  a customary nature and 
therefore binding all States irrespective of  the place where the violations are 
committed (Nollkaemper 2011).
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Such an approach was endorsed by the ECtHR. In the Demir and Baykara 
case, the Court found that Turkey was responsible for the violations of  the 
right to free assembly on the basis of  some international agreements which 
were not ratified by that State, but which, nonetheless, were considered by 
the ECtHR as part of  general international obligations binding upon States. 
In that occasion the Court stressed that “it is not necessary for the respon-
dent State to have ratified the entire collection of  instruments that are ap-
plicable in respect of  the precise subject matter of  the case concerned […] 
to denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in 
international law”.
This case is considered as a demonstration of  the living character of  hu-
man rights and that human rights norms must be interpreted in accordance 
with the current stance of  international law, even taking into account norms 
that are not binding upon States through treaties but nonetheless binding as 
part of  customary international law (Zimmele 2013). 
It is clear from what precedes that although the doctrinal debate on the 
customary nature of  human rights is far from reaching a unique position, do-
mestic courts have elaborated tools to extend States’ jurisdiction by making 
reference to general international law.
4. the extraterrItorIal applIcatIon of human rIghts’ treatIes
The phenomenon of  extraterritorial application of  human rights norms 
has always been linked to the application of  international human rights trea-
ties, such as the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Therefore, 
the practice concerning the extraterritoriality of  human rights is mainly de-
veloped by the commissions and the courts that deal with the extraterritorial 
application of  the above-mentioned treaties (De Sena 2002). The ECtHR, 
in particular, has been playing an active role to this end; its jurisprudence is 
constantly evolving and it is leading in this field.
Although the ECtHR affirmed in the Bankovic case (2001) that its juris-
diction is primarily territorial and that it should be confined to the espace 
juridique of  the States parties to the Convention, nowadays it is common-
ly accepted that the ECHR is competent extraterritorially. The ECtHR has 
opened the way to the extraterritorial application of  the Convention in cases 
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where States exercise control over an area or an individual or a group of  
individuals outside of  their borders.  
In this regard, the Judges in Strasbourg elaborated two notions of  control 
(Milanovic 2011).
The first is the “effective control over an area” exception, typically of  
actions conducted by public agents outside the country’s territory. The ex-
amples are military actions in other countries, as detailed in Loizidou v. Turkey, 
Ilascu v. Moldova, Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia. In the first, the Court 
ruled for the first time that the responsibility of  a Contracting Party might 
also arise when States exercise effective overall control of  portion of  terri-
tory outside its own. In that case, Turkey was militarily occupying a portion 
of  the territory of  Cyprus. Human rights’ obligations of  the State occupying 
foreign territories should extend to such territories under occupation: any 
other solution would result in depriving the population under occupation 
of  the protection of  human rights for the sole reason that the occupation is 
illegal under international law.
In Ilascu and Catan the ECtHR dealt with two cases concerning similar 
circumstances in the same territory. In the latter, while the Court found that 
control exercised by the Russian federation over Transdnistria had been de-
creasing over the years and notwithstanding the lack of  direct involvement 
by Russian authorities, Russia still had jurisdiction over the area. This shows 
that the concept of  ‘effective control’ is changeable and dependent on a 
case-by-case assessment. 
The second notion of  control implies a control over individuals. This 
line of  reasoning was first developed by the ECtHR in the Issa and Others v. 
Turkey case in 2004, in which the Turkish army violated the right to life of  
Iraqi citizens who were killed in military operations. The Court reaffirmed 
the principle in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011), where it held that the UK 
was responsible for having failed to protect the right to life of  Iraqi citizens 
under its control. It must be said, however, that the ECtHR, in the Al-Skei-
ni case, found that the UK was exercising control over both an area – the 
Basrah City in Iraq – and a group of  individuals, precisely those killed in the 
contested military operation.
This notion of  control allowed the ECtHR to extend the application of  
the ECtHR  to vessels in the high seas. In Medvedyev v. France, in particular, 
where a Cambodian vessel was intercepted in high seas by the French Navy, 
the Court stated that since the boat was under the control of  French au-
13
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thority, the crew onboard was subjected to French jurisdiction. The same 
reasoning was developed in the case Hirsii Jamaa and Others v. Italy (2012), in 
which Italian authorities rescued Somalian and Eritrean citizens in high seas. 
Considering that the asylum seekers were held into custody on Italian navy 
ships, they were considered under Italian jurisdiction according to the law of  
the sea, which extend States’ jurisdiction over vessels that ship under those 
States’ flag.
In particular – and concerning the issue of  migration control – the Hirsi 
and Jamaa case is surely the leading one. In that case, the ECtHR had to assess 
if  Italy could be deemed to have control over some migrants intercepted 
in the high seas and subsequently handed over to Libyan authorities in a 
classic pushback operation within the framework of  the 2009 agreement 
between Italy and Libya. The ECtHR affirmed that Italy had jurisdiction on 
the ground that it exercised “de jure and de facto control” over the migrants. To 
reach this conclusion the Court applied the principles enshrined in the Mon-
tego Bay Convention and in the Italian Navigation Code, according to which 
Italy has jurisdiction for facts committed on its vessels, even in the high seas 
(Napoletano 2012). In this case, therefore, there was no need to explore the 
definition of  control as the facts at stake occurred on board of  a vessel of  
the Italian Armed Forces. Although it was somehow an easy case to decide, it 
is important as it clarifies that pushback operations violate human rights law 
even if  they are performed outside States’ territory. 
The principle of  extraterritorial jurisdiction of  States under Article 1 has 
been recently reinforced in Chiragov v. Armenia (2015). The ECtHR affirmed 
that “the concept of  jurisdiction within the meaning of  Article 1 of  the 
Convention “is not restricted to the national territory of  the High Contract-
ing Parties and the State’s responsibility can be involved because of  acts and 
omissions of  their authorities producing effects outside their own territo-
ry”. This case is also important because accepted a lower standard of  proof  
to establish the extraterritorial jurisdiction of  Armenia. In fact, the Court 
evaluated the exercise of  effective control over an area considering more 
elements than just the physical presence of  States’ agents in the territory of  
another State, such as political and financial support to foreign troops or 
governments.
This last judgment shows that although the link between territory and 
jurisdiction is still present in the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR, there is room 
for adopt a flexible approach to the notion of  effective control. In fact, the 
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rationale of  the recent case law of  the Court is “the need to avoid a vacuum 
in Convention protection” (Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, 2015). With this in mind, 
some international law categories could be interpreted in a more liberal way, 
to expand the reach of  human rights law.
It is understood, however, that the application of  the ECtHR is limited 
to the European States that have ratified it; hence, it is not enforceable in 
other regional scenarios. This notwithstanding, the evolution of  the juris-
prudence of  the ECtHR is of  an utmost importance as it can influence the 
interpretation of  jurisdictional clauses in other human rights treaties such as 
the ICCPR.
The ICCPR is broader in scope, being it a universal treaty, hence it applies 
in scenarios such as the one mentioned in the introduction: the offshore de-
tention centers in Nauru. Australia is part of  the ICCPR. 
In light of  the above-mentioned interpretation of  the jurisdictional claus-
es of  human rights treaties, it should be demonstrated that Australia is exer-
cising extraterritorial control over the detention centers in Nauru or over the 
individuals detained therein. This seems to be possible for several reasons. 
First, Australia exercised control through the two agreements signed with 
Nauru and physically transferring the migrants in the Island. Moreover, there 
are allegations that Australian officials contribute to the running of  the de-
tention centers, being physically present in Nauru. This can be sufficient to 
extend the reach of  the ICCPR. 
5. the “real” problem: the enforcement of the rIghts of asylum 
seekers
the real problem posed at the beginning of  this paper cannot be solved 
by answering the question: which source of  law is the most appropriate for 
making human rights more effective? In fact, if  we look at the substance of  
the human rights of  asylum seekers, we should probably conclude without 
any doubt that they are customary in nature. 
The rights connected with the protection of  these individuals are centered 
in the principle of  non-refoulement, which is stated in article 33 of  the 1951 Ge-
neva Convention on the Protection of  Refugees. It is now commonly accept-
ed that the principle of  non-refoulement is part of  customary international law 
and therefore binding for all States (Pisillo Mazzeschi 2011). Furthermore, 
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with respect to migrants, human rights norms of  a general character must 
be regarded as applicable. As noted, there is a tendency of  merging human 
rights norms and norms related more specifically to the rights of  migrants 
(ibidem). This process more specifically regards five civil and political rights 
that might be at risk in the operations and procedure aimed at limiting migra-
tion fluxes: the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or inhu-
mane treatment, the right not to be subjected to slavery and finally the right 
to access to a remedy in case of  expulsion. For all these rights, it can be said 
that, apart from their inclusion in international treaties, their binding forces 
derives from customary international law (ibidem). The prohibition of  torture 
is even considered a jus cogens rule, to which no derogation is permissible.
Domestic courts can apply customary human rights norms, as seen, to 
extend their States’ jurisdiction and therefore offer protection to asylum 
seekers whose rights are violated ‘offshore’. The same can be said for rights 
enshrined in human rights treaties. At both universal and regional level, their 
extraterritorial application is no longer disputed. Therefore, ‘offshore law’ 
does not immunize States as they must ensure the application of  human 
rights even if  they shift the management of  migration control outside their 
borders.
Therefore, the real question should probably be, is it possible to enforce 
such rights?
Looking again at the Australian case, it is worth noting that Australia is part 
of  the first Optional Protocol of  the ICCPR that established the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC). The HRC is a monitoring body that can receive individual 
communications regarding violations of  the rights enshrined in the ICCPR. 
While the function of  the Committee in considering individual communica-
tions is not, as such, that of  a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee 
under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of  a judicial 
decision. They are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the impartiality and 
independence of  Committee members, the considered interpretation of  the 
language of  the Covenant, and the determinative character of  the decisions.
It remains possible that an individual or group of  individuals affected by 
the offshore processing regime may bring a claim against Australia before 
HRC. If  this committee were to find that Australia had breached its inter-
national obligations, Australia would have a duty to respect the international 
processes it has voluntarily agreed to be bound by, and bring its law and 
policies into line with international law accordingly.
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However, successive Australian governments have sought to argue that they 
do not bear responsibility for what is happening in Nauru. These arguments 
are generally based on a combination of  (1) the fact that asylum seekers and 
refugees are located in the territory of  another sovereign State; and on (2) the 
assertion that Australia does not have the very high level of  effective control 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over asylum seekers and refugees offshore. 
As a result, according to the Australian government, this is sufficient to deny the 
possibility of  Australia owing asylum seekers human rights’ obligations.
Apparently, there are few possibilities to sanction the human rights vio-
lations suffered by asylum seekers in Nauru, even though, as we have seen 
before, human rights are applicable to them and Australia should in principle 
be responsible for that conduct. 
6. the solutIon “Is not to be found In the gunman sItuatIon” but 
rather In the enhancement of the role of domestIc courts
The partial conclusion presented in the previous paragraph might suggest 
another question: is international law strong enough to limit the practices of  
States in the field of  migration control?
Many authors challenge the force of  international law because of  its in-
ability to sanction violations committed by States (Schauer 2015). This posi-
tion relies on the assumption that law consists of  rules issued by a sovereign, 
which defines them as commands, coercive orders, and backs them by the 
threat of  imposing sanctions in case of  non-compliance (Austin 1832). Re-
cently, the ‘new-realist’ approach to international law reinvigorated this ar-
gument affirming that only States’ interests decisively determine compliance 
with its international obligations (Goldsmith and Posner 2005).
However, the above-mentioned doctrinal theories seem to offer a misrep-
resentation of  the features of  international law. If  one judges international 
law solely on this basis, it would be probably easy to conclude that interna-
tional law is…not law. Indeed, the force of  international law “is not to be 
found in the gunman situation” (Hart 1994) but, rather, in its intrinsic value. 
This is particularly true in the field of  human rights, where States’ choice to 
comply with international rules should be limited (Ohlin 2015).
Moving from the last consideration, one should not underestimate the 
potential of  domestic courts in enhancing human rights law and, more in 
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general, international law. Indeed, national judges might contribute to fill 
the gap between the expanding scope of  human rights law and the lack of  
international enforcement mechanisms (Shany 2012). Domestic courts can 
therefore act as courts of  the international legal order, enforcing rules ema-
nating from international law.
George Scelle (1943) theorized such a role for national courts, labelling 
this phenomenon dedoublément fonctionnel. Scelle’s main argument is that inter-
national society is affected by a carence institutionnelle, lacking legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial functions (Dubouchet 2007). The dedoublément fonctionnel 
theory postulates that, as international law lacks these basic functions, it is up 
to States’ organs to perform them using “leur capacité ‘fonctionnelle’ telle qu’elle 
est organisée dans l’ordre juridique qui les a institués, mais pour assurer l’efficacité des 
normes d’un autre ordre juridique privé des organes nécessaires à cette réalisation, ou n’en 
possédant que d’insuffisants” (Scelle 1956). 
With regard to the rights of  asylum seekers, this could be a promising 
scenario. Indeed, in the past, domestic courts have already contributed both 
to the affirmation of  the customary nature of  the principle of  non-refoulement 
and to the enforcement of  the related rights (Iovane 2012).
A recent judgment (February 2016) of  the High Court in Canberra seems 
to contradict this argument. That court found that the indefinite detention to 
which asylum seekers in Nauru have been subject since 2012 is legitimate as 
it finds justification in a law that allows the Australian government to trans-
fer individuals to Nauru and to contribute to the offshore detention center 
located in that Island.
To now, this seems to be the only case presented before an Australian 
court; therefore, it is not enough to establish a jurisprudential precedent. 
However, something needs to change in the perception of  national judges 
and this is precisely where the values of  international law might come into 
play. Domestic orders should feel that they must uphold human rights. To 
this end, international law should be intended as an incentive that includes 
“sticks and carrots” (Shany 2012).
It is not easy to find an effective stick to induce national courts to enforce 
the rights of  the asylum seekers, but a possibility came out recently. On Feb-
ruary 2017, the Global Legal Action Network (Glan) and the Stanford Inter-
national Human Rights Clinic submitted to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) a legal brief, detailing what the network describes as the “harrowing 
practices of  the Australian State and corporations towards asylum seekers”. 
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The petition asks to the office of  the prosecutor of  the ICC to open an in-
vestigation into possible “crimes against humanity committed by individuals 
and corporate actors”. 
It is early to predict the outcome of  this submission, but it is not wrong 
to say that the case is not an easy one. However, this sort of  activities may 
trigger the response of  the global public opinion, so as to reinforce the in-
trinsic value of  international law and, eventually, push national judges to 
enforce human rights law. In fact, the ICC jurisdiction is a complementary 
one: should the Prosecutor start a preliminary examination, Australia would 
have the power to stop it by investigating on its own the violations of  human 
rights suffered by asylum seekers in Nauru.
The Australia-Nauru case is just one of  the cases that could be defined 
as ‘offshore law’. The nature of  the incentives that will encourage national 
courts to enforce human rights law will vary according to the scenario, but 
a common feature shall be found in the values stemming from international 
law.
A ‘stick’ is not a gun to the head of  States, but a legal tool that should 
lead national judges to reflect on a practice that can hardly be viewed as an 
enforcement of  the rights of  asylum seekers and, eventually, it can give force 
to international human rights law. 
7. fInal and paradoxIcal remarks
At the beginning of  this paper, I tried to explain that the practice in the field 
of  migration control is shifting towards an extraterritorial paradigm, as States 
and international organizations are deliberately dealing with this issue outside 
their territories. I labelled this practice as ‘offshore law’ for mainly two rea-
sons: 1) it actually finds justification in legal acts; 2) it is part of  broader picture 
where territory is losing importance.‘Offshore law’ has a negative impact on the 
protection of  human rights and asylum seekers The growing scope of  human 
rights law, in theory, mitigates such a negative impact. In fact, both the evolution 
of  customary law and the jurisprudence of  international courts and tribunals 
are showing a tendency towards a universal enforcement of  human rights.
I therefore argued that the real problem is the lack of  enforcement mech-
anisms and bolstered the idea that domestic courts should have a role in 
filling this gap.
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This conclusion appears as a paradox. The paper started by acknowl-
edging that in international law the very notion of  territory is losing weight, 
as States’ actions are becoming extraterritorial by their nature. In conclu-
sion, quite surprisingly, I suggested the role of  domestic courts should be 
strengthened, as far as migration control and other international law issues 
are concerned; such an argument, moreover, implies a territorial dimension 
of  the law (Oddenino 2015). 
The paradox might have a way out. The territorial dimension of  the law 
counterbalances the inclination of  States to externalize their conducts and 
can offer a remedy to those asylum seekers who are struggling for their sur-
vival around the world.
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